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ARBITRATION AND LATIN AMERICA
LIONEL M. SUMMERS*
In his recent statement on economic assistance and in-
vestment security, President Nixon said:
One way to make reasonable provision for just compensation
in an expropriation dispute is to refer the dispute to interna-
tional adjudication or arbitration. Firm agreement in ad-
vance on dispute settlement procedures is a desirable means
of anticipating possible disagreements between host govern-
ments and foreign investors.'
While the President's language is couched in universal terms, it
has particular relevancy to Latin America, where recent expropri-
ations have made headlines, and investments and their protection
are a constant source of concern. Moreover, dispute settlement
procedures do not benefit investors exclusively.
Few in Latin America, either presently or in the past, have
argued in principle against the theoretical desirability of settling
international disputes through arbitration or adjudication. Thus,
even a cursory survey shows that Latin American writers and
statesmen are loud in their praise of arbitration and adjudication;2
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1. 66 U.S. DEP'T STATE BULL. 154 (1972).
Arbitration connotes the use of an ad hoc court, commission, or tribunal
created specifically to pass on a particular dispute or series of disputes; whereas
adjudication connotes the use of a permanently established court, such as the
present World Court. The essential purpose is, of course, the same.
2. See lntroduci6n General to ANTONIO G6MEZ ROBLEDO, MEXICO Y EL
ARBITRAJE INTERNACIONAL (1965). At xii, Robledo states, "Nuestros arbitrajes
internacionades han sido asi espejo de nuestras virtudes y defectos; pero el
saldo final, digam6slo con satisfacci6n, ha sido altamente positivo ."
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Pan-American conferences, Bar Associations and learned societies
make resounding declarations in favor of arbitration;' and nations
are willing to subscribe to conventions containing broad generali-
ties concerning the peaceful settlement of disputes.' When, how-
3. See, e.g., the proposal of the National Bar Association of Peru for the
Settlement of International Disputes by International Tribunals, made at the
Washington World Conference on World Peace Through Law [1965] at 748
(1967), which read:
The World Conference on World Peace Through Law declares that the
following are highly desirable for the good, the prosperity, and the
security of the nations of the world: . . . .2. The submission of all
differences or disputes between nations to direct treatment of them or
in the absence of this, to consideration by the competent international
agencies of the United Nations or to the decision of an international
arbitral tribunal to which the parties agree to subject themselves.
See also Resolution adopted on May 3, 1923, at the Fifth International Confer-
ence of American States, THE INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCES OF AMERICAN
STATES 1889-1928, at 283-84 (J. Scott, ed. 1931); PROCEEDINGS OF THE INTER-
NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF AMERICAN STATES ON CONCILIATION AND ARBITRA-
TION, held in Washington, D.C., December 10, 1928-January 5, 1929 (1929).
4. See Everett, International Arbitration in the Americas, 17 N.Y.U.L.Q.
REv. 617, 623 (1940):
The Mexican Peace Code seeks to marshal the essence of the instru-
ments which make up the existing peace machinery, listed by Alfaro
as follows:
1. The Pecuniary Claims Convention of Buenos Aires, of 1910 (1
BEVANS 763 (1969) ).
2. The Gondra Convention of 1923 (2 BEVANS 413 (1969)).
3. The General Treaty of Inter-American Arbitration of Washington,
of 1929 (2 BEVANS 737 (1969) ).
4. The Protocol of Progressive Arbitration simultaneously signed with
the former treaty (2 BEVANS 743 (1969) ).
5. The General Convention of Inter-American Conciliation, of the
same year (2 BEVANS 745 (1969) ).
6. The Anti-War Pact signed at Rio de Janeiro in October, 1933 (3
BEVANS 135 (1969) ).
7. The Additional Protocol signed at Montevideo in December, 1933
(3 BEVANS 161 (1969) ).
8. The Convention for the Maintenance, Preservation, and Reestablish-
ment of Peace, signed, like the following three, at Buenos Aires in
December, 1936 (3 BEVANS 338 (1969) ).
9. The Treaty for the Prevention of Controversies (3 BEVANS 357
(1969) ).
10. The Inter-American Treaty of Good Offices and Mediation (3
BEVANS 362 (1969) ).
11. The Convention to Coordinate, Extend, and Assure the Fulfill-
ment of the Existing Treaties between American States (3 BEVANS
348 (1969) ).
(The citations to Bevans have been supplied for convenient reference). See also
W. MANNING, ARBITRATION TREATIES AMONG THE AMERICAN NATIONS TO THE
CLOSE OF THE YEAR 1910 (1924); O.A.S. CHARTER, 2 U.S.T. 2394, T.I.A.S. No.
2361 which, in article 23, provided for the Pact of Bogota, a treaty that was
to establish procedures for the peaceful settlement of disputes. See SLATER,
THE OAS AND UNITED STATES FOREIGN POLICY (1967), which states, at 23, that
the Pact of Bogota has . . . been a dead letter from the start." At 27, Slater
indicates:
[A] group of Latin American states led by Mexico insisted on
Vol. 3
2
California Western International Law Journal, Vol. 3, No. 1 [1972], Art. 11
https://scholarlycommons.law.cwsl.edu/cwilj/vol3/iss1/11
ARBITRATION AND LATIN AMERICA
ever, it comes to arbitrating or adjudicating a definite dispute or
even considering submitting potential but well-defined future dif-
ferences to an international legal body, the picture-particularly
the contemporary picture-changes abruptly. At present there
seems to be a general unwillingness on the part of Latin American
states to submit specific controversies to arbitration or adjudication,
particularly if the adversary power is the United States or one of
the European states, i.e. one of the old imperialist powers. (The
United States and the European nations will henceforth for con-
venience be referred to collectively as "the North Atlantic States.")
Although the situation is not promising, it is fruitless to la-
ment it without suggesting a possible alternative. As a prelimi-
nary to making any suggestions, it is obviously necessary to try to
reach an understanding of the legal, philosophical, and historical
background of arbitration and adjudication in Latin America and
the forces and factors that have led to present attitudes.
I. FORCES AND INFLUENCES AFFECTING INTERNATIONAL
LEGAL SETTLEMENTS IN LATIN AMERICA
A. Tradition of the Roman and European Law
Many of the Latin nations (for example, Guatemala, Peru
and Bolivia) are composed primarily of non-Caucasion elements,
particularly Indians.' The rulers and the educated, however, have
been predominately Caucasion and their legal roots are in Europe.
Even when the mestizo is in political control, as in Mexico, the
legal profession looks for inspiration and guidance to Roman and
European law.6 In certain definite fields, such as land holdings
or water rights, Indian concepts or practices may still be ob-
served;7 but the basic philosophy is essentially European, with
more stringent procedures, and a new version of the draft treaty pro-
vided that all controversies were to be arbitrated when other methods
failed. It was in this latter form that the pact was approved, but it was
a Pyrrhic victory for the Mexican group, since seven states, including
the United States, signed with reservations that vitiated the compulsory
settlement procedures.
See also A. THOMAS & A.J. THOMAS, JR., THE ORGANIZATION OF AMERICAN STATES
281 (1963).
5. For an analysis of the pattern of race in Latin America see H.
ROBINSON, LATIN AMERICA, A GEOGRAPHICAL SURVEY (1967); at 44, Robinson
has included a map showing racial distribution by areas.
6. R. DAVID & J. BRIERLY, MAJOR SYSTEMS IN THE WORLD TODAY 21
(1968), speak of Latin American law as belonging to the Romano-Germanic
Family of Laws.
7. There seems to be very little left of Indian law as such. The records
of the Inca system are almost nonexistent. The Aztec system has had some
1972
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the influence of the United States making itself felt to some de-
gree in political science and international law. The federal type
of government was essentially copied from the United States.'
While some Latin Americans do speak of American interna-
tional law,9 they generally think of it as a regional manifestation
within a global system, accepted as part of a continuous legal
tradition. It is difficult to imagine many Latin American jurists
saying, as did an Indian jurist:
international law was no longer the almost exclusive
preserve of the peoples of European blood, 'by whose consent
it exists and for the settlement of whose differences it is ap-
plied or at least invoked.' Now that international law must
be regarded as embracing other peoples, it clearly required
their consent no less.
10
This did not, of course, prevent the emergence of such doctrines
as the Calvo and Drago doctrines," the making of efforts to whit-
tle down the limits of state responsibility, and the development of
other theories peculiar to Latin America.' 2 In fact, there are
attention devoted to it, but at best its present influence is marginal in national
law and virtually nonexistent in international law. For a bibliographic note on
the rather meager studies of Incan and Aztec law see J. WIGMORE, A PANORAMA
OF THE WORLD'S LEGAL SYSTEMS 1125 n.1 (1936).
8. For a general survey of the executive power in Latin America see M.
JORRIN, GOVERNMENTS OF LATIN AMERICA 77-97 (1953); see also A. EDEL-
MANN, LATIN AMERICAN GOVERNMENT AND POLITICS 378 (1965): "The influ-
ence exerted by the United States has been most profound in Argentina,
Brazil, Mexico, and Venezuela, all of whom adopted a federal system of govern-
ment patterned largely after that of the United States."
9. See, e.g., A. ALVAREZ, LE Dnorr INTERNATIONAL AMERICAN (1910);
1 A. DE BUSTAMENTE Y SIRVEN, DERECHO INTERNACIONAL PUBLICO 36-37
(1933); H. JACOBINI, A STUDY OF THE PHILOSOPHY OF INTERNATIONAL LAW AS
SEEN IN WORKS OF LATIN AMERICAN WRITERS 121 (1954); H. JACOINI, INTER-
NATIONAL LAW, A TEXT 27 (1968); A. Alvarez, Latin American and Interna-
tional Law, 3 AM. J. INT'L L. 269 (1909).
10. R. Panand, The Role of the 'New' Asian-African Countries, 56 AM.
J. INT'L L. 388 (1962) (quoting Dr. R.B. Pal).
11. Calvo and Drago were both Argentine jurists. Drago opposed the use
of force in collecting debts owed by a state to foreign nationals, while Calvo
argued that a state was not responsible for damages sustained by an alien during
the course of a civil war. In general, his theories led to many Latin American
efforts to limit diplomatic intervention. One manifestation has been the Calvo
Clause on which there is a profuse literature (see W. BISHOP JR., INTERNATIONAL
LAW 820 n.84 (1971); C. FENWICK, INTERNATIONAL LAW 341, 354 (1965).
12. According to one Latin American author,
Los principios peculiares del Derecho Internacional Americano serian
el 'uti possidetis', la igualdad juridica de los Estados, la descalificaci6n de
la conquista, la no intervenci6n, el arbitraje obligatorio[?, la codifica-
Vol. 3
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many areas in international law that Latin America jurists spice
with a local flavor. The underlying tradition, nevertheless, is
North Atlantic. Since that tradition stresses the importance of the
legal settlement of disputes,'" it is not surprising that Latin Amer-
ican jurists embraced arbitration in principle and that Latin Amer-
ican states at first participated actively in a large number of arbi-
trations. When disillusionment set in, it applied to practice rather
than to theory. An illuminating parallel might be drawn with
the general Latin American compulsion to have a constitution,
even if in day-to-day life little attention is paid to its provisions. 4
B. The Latin American Experience with Arbitration
In the greater part of the century that followed the inde-
pendence of Latin America, the protestations in favor of arbitra-
tion were matched by an at least apparent willingness to arbitrate
particular disputes. That willingness, nevertheless, decreased
with the years. Even in the formative years, it is highly doubtful
whether it was universal. Be that as it may, Latin American
states, according to a survey of arbitrations from 1794 to 1938
compiled by Stuyt, a Dutch jurist, participated in almost 200 arbi-
trations up to the eve of World War II. 1 That number is impres-
sive even after due allowance is made for the probability that, in
many cases, arbitration was consented to reluctantly.' 6 When it
was sought by a Latin American state, the reason may well have
been that the alternative of military landing parties and economic
ci6n del derecho internacional privado y las doctrinas Drago, Tovar y
Estrada.
1 R. FERRERO REBAGLIATI, DERECHO INTERNACIONAL 14 (1966) (emphasis and
question mark added).
13. It is interesting that arbitration is in the tradition of formal adversary
proceedings, which is largely an institution of the Western World. The Euro-
pean attitude toward arbitration is typically positive: "En d6pit des obstacles
auxquels il se huerte, I'arbitrage international a une place 6minente parmi les
proc6d6s destin6s A assurer le maintien d'un orde juste et la pr6servation de la
paix dans la Soci6t6 internationale." 1 A. LAPRADELLE & J. NIBOYET, REPER-
TOIRE DE DROIT INTERNATIONAL 669 (1929).
14. A. EDELMANN, supra note 8, at 372.
15. This author had hoped to be able to classify the arbitrations, or at
least some of them, according to whether they had been entered into willingly
or unwillingly. It has been concluded that it is virtually impossible to make
such a classification.
16. A. STUYT, SURVEY OF INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATIONS 1794-1938 passim
(1939); for a list including United States and European arbitrations, see J.
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pressure was worse. Nor was force always limited to landing par-
ties whose stay was temporary. The pretext of both the United
States-Mexican war and the Maximilian adventure, which began
as a three-nation demarche, was at least in part the failure of Mex-
ico to pay claims. 17  Other nations besides Mexico had felt the
heavy hand of neocolonialism or suffered from the intrigues of
adventurers such as William Walker in Nicaragua. 8 To com-
plete the picture, it should be added that while the United States
was sometimes a villain whose actions created mistrust, that mis-
trust was somewhat cushioned by the genuine feeling in the after-
glow of independence that the United States was the pioneer of
freedom and liberty and a friend of Latin America. Times and
events adulterated that image.1"
It would be pointless to discuss whether the earlier arbitra-
tions were entered into by a genuine respect for the arbitral proc-
ess or by fear of force, or by a combination of both factors. It
cannot be questioned, however, that a large number of disputes
were resolved through arbitration. The disputes were submitted
to the Pope or his representatives, to foreign sovereigns including
Victoria and Edward VII of England, Wilhelm H of Germany,
Alexander II of Russia, Alfonso XIII of Spain, Leopold I of Bel-
gium, to the Presidents of France, the United States, and Switzer-
land, to foreign governmental institutions such as the Senate of
Hamburg and the Courts of Cassation in Paris and Rome, and to
innumerable North Atlantic jurists and diplomats.
It is rather interesting that the sovereign or head of state to
whom the dispute was referred, or the individual acting in a pivot-
al capacity as a neutral commissioner or umpire, was so seldom
a Latin American. The few exceptions were almost exclusively
in intra-Latin arbitrations. Even then the Latin American na-
tions tended to place their trust in North Atlantic sovereigns,
heads of state, and nationals. It may be concluded that the Latin
17. For comments on the causes of the Mexican War, particularly the
unpaid claims of foreign citizens against the Mexican government, see G.
PRICE, ORIGINS OF THE WAR WITH MEXICO 24 (1967); A. HANNA & K. HANNA,
NAPOLEAN III AND MEXICO 40 (1971).
18. W. SCROGGS, FILIBUSTERS AND FINANCIERS, THE STORY OF WILLIAM
WALKER AND His ASSOCIATES (1916).
19. Commenting on early relations, one author stated: "Our attitude to-
ward the Latin American countries as they struggled for and won their inde-
pendence in the years from 1810 to 1824 has left a generally pleasant legacy."
Matthews, Diplomatic Relations, in THE UNITED STATES AND LATIN AMERICA
122 (H. Matthews ed., 2d ed. 1963).
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American countries had a pathetic trust in the rectitude of North
Atlantic monarchs, statesmen and jurists, or that pressure was
brought to bear on the Latin American state to accept the arbiter
suggested by the opposing North Atlantic power, or that intra-
American distrust precluded the selection of a Latin American to
act in a comparable capacity.
By far the bulk of the arbitrations took place in, or were
initiated in, roughly the first century following Latin American
independence or, to be more exact, from 1829, the date of the
first arbitration, through 1910. In that period, Latin American
states entered into almost 80 arbitrations with European states,
around 40 with the United States, around 40 among themselves,
and 1 with Japan.20 In round numbers, there were 160 arbitra-
tions. The year 1910 marked the turning point; this was the
year when the Mexican revolution of 1910-1923 led to the fall of
Porfirio Diaz. It was a revolution that developed strong anti-
capitalist and anti-foreign tendencies, which had reverberations
outside of Mexico. It was, moreover, the first social (as con-
trasted with palace) revolution in Latin America. In point of
time, it merged with the trauma of World War I, which marked
the initial decline of imperialism and shook the foundations of
the old power structure.
In the period after 1910, the number of arbitrations began
to drop. From 1910 to 1939, there were not quite 30 arbitra-
tions involving Latin America, or approximately 1 per annum-in
contrast to approximately 2 per annum from 1829 through 1910.
Since World War 11, the only significant arbitrations involving
Latin America have related to the boundaries between Chile and
Argentina, and Honduras and Nicaragua. 2 Three elements have
probably contributed to this diminishing trend: the fading of im-
perialism, the growing restiveness of the Latin American states,
and their increasing disenchantment with arbitration in practice,
if not in theory. This disenchantment was undoubtedly fueled by
20. The figures are not absolutely exact, because it is not always clear
which arbitrations should be counted. For example, the Venezuelan Prefer-
ence Case was essentially between the states contending for a share of meager
Venezuelan revenues rather than between Venezuela and the other powers. See
J. RALsToN, VENEZUELAN ARBITRATIONS OF 1903, S. Doc. No. 316, 58th Cong.,
2d Sess. 1057-59 (1904).
21. Argentine-Chile Frontier Case, 38 I.L.R. 10 (1969). In many re-
spects the Honduras-Nicaragua Mixed Commission was not a true arbitral body.
Honduras-Nicaragua Mixed Commission Decision, 30 I.L.R. 76 (1966).
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the unfortunate facts that (a) arbitral processes were sometimes
invoked to vindicate outrageous claims;2" (b) a Latin state never
or scarcely ever managed to have a Latin American act as an ar-
biter in a pivotal capacity;2" (c) the record was essentially one
sided, that is, a Latin American nation was always the defendant
except in those rare cases where a Commission was created
to hear the claims of nationals of both sides; 4 and (d) the total
amount of the awards was disproportionately large in favor of the
North Atlantic states.25 There is at least some explanation for
this imbalance. Latin American nations themselves preferred Eu-
ropean sovereigns as arbiters to their own presidents, even in intra-
American disputes. There were more North Atlantic nationals
and investments in Latin America than Latin American citizens
and investments in Europe and the United States. Also, the con-
tinual revolutions and upheavals in Latin America did cause con-
siderable damage to persons and property.20 Nevertheless, even
22. See 1 M. WHITEMAN, DAMAGES IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 164 (1937).
23. See A. STuYT, supra note 16, passim.
24. See A. STUYT, supra note 16, in which the author fails to record even
one case where a North Atlantic state was the defendant in an arbitration re-
lating to a single claim and in commissions hearing nationals of both parties,
the Latin American claimants were in a minority. A. FELLER, THE MEXICAN
CLAIMS COMMISSIONS 60 (1935), gives the following statistics:
American Claims
Claims filed 2,781, amounting to $513,694,267.17
Claims disallowed or dismissed 50
Awards made 89, amounting to 4,607,926.59
Mexican Claims
Claims filed 846, amounting to $246,158,395.32
Claims disallowed or dismissed 4
Awards made 5, amounting to 39,000.00
The original Commission lapsed and a new Commission was established in 1934
(9 BEVANS 1008). Eventually there was a lump sum settlement by which these
claims, as well as others, were settled for $40,000,000 (9 BEVANS 1059).
25. As of 1923, the aggregate amounts of the awards in arbitrations be-
tween the United States and Latin American countries was $18,451,738.72
awarded to the United States in comparison with $3,444,476.66 awarded to
Latin American states. W. ROBERTSON, HISPANIC-AMERICAN RELATIONS WITH
THE UNITED STATES 166 (1923).
26. But see Silvert, Political Change in Latin America, in THE UNITED
STATES AND LATIN AMERICA 61 (H. Matthews ed., 2d ed. 1963), which, at 69-70,
caveats the typical reaction to Latin American revolutions by stating:
A Chilean political figure has written that some Latin Americans want
'order even if in despotism,' and that others want 'liberty even if in
anarchy.' Before an ordering of liberty is attained, there will probably
be much more trouble in Latin America. But the real amount of vio-
lence as such should not be overestimated. The number of revolutions
in Latin America is accentuated by the North American, who tends to
forget that there are twenty different republics all having their own
troubles, and who does not understand the patterning of Latin vio-
Vol. 3
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with the making of every allowance, the imbalance is still remark-
able.
The grievances outlined would have been enough in itself to
render Latin America wary of arbitrations. In addition, the im-
position of arbitration by force in some cases must have rankled.
The Venezuelan arbitrations of 1903 are probably an outstanding
example of such a case. England, Germany, and Italy blockaded
the Venezuelan coast to induce Venezuela to settle some long out-
standing claims having their origins in the chaotic civil wars
which, under the dictator Cipriano Castro, tore Venezuela apart
prior to the turn of the century. During that blockade, there were
one or two bombardments of the Venezuelan shore and a few
small Venezuelan gunboats were sunk. According to some ac-
counts, Venezuela herself asked for arbitration. Obviously, how-
ever, her eagerness to arbitrate was motivated far more by an in-
ability to resist than by any abstract admiration for arbitration.2 7
In any event, Venezuela wound up having to submit to ten arbi-
tration commissions, one each with the United States, Belgium,
Great Britain, Germany, Italy, Mexico, Netherlands, Spain,
France, and Norway and Sweden (which at that time were still
united).28  Only Mexico was a sister Latin American state. How-
ever, considering the subservience of Porfirio Diaz, then President
of Mexico, to foreign interests and the willingness of the North
Atlantic states to regard Diaz as one of themselves, Mexico was
at that time much more closely tied to North America than to the
lands on the south.
29
While the Venezuelan case is the one most commonly cited
to demonstrate the inability of the Latin American states to resist
foreign insistence, it was by no means the only instance where
force was exerted to collect claims directly or through the inter-
lence, the often reduced number of persons involved, and the built-in
limitations of the impact of civil disorder on daily life.
27. The diplomacy of the Venezuelan case and an account mentioning
Venezuela's desire to arbitrate are given in the biography of John Hay con-
tained in 9 THE AMERICAN SECRETARIES OF STATE AND THEIR DIPLOMACY 173
(S. Bemis ed. 1958). The fact that Latin American nations asked for arbitra-
tion to avoid an even worse loss is also illustrated by Mexico's desperate desire
for arbitration to ward off the warlike operations of the French, which led to the
Pastry War in 1839. See A. FELLER, THE MEXICAN CLAIMS COMMISSIONS 7
(1935). -
28. J. RALSTON, VENEZUELAN ARBLTRATIONS OF 1903 passim (1904).
29. See J. CREELMAN, DIAz, MASTER OF MEXICO (1911), which, at 419,
quotes Elihu Root in a glowing eulogy of Diaz on the eve of the Mexican
Revolution when the legend of Porfirio Diaz was still high.
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mediary of the arbitral process. In fact, an English writer has
tried to prove that there was nothing unusual about the Venezue-
lan situation. He says:
In what sense, then, could the Venezuelan episode be de-
scribed as distinctly different from a number of parallel ex-
amples of coercion, the most recent of which had been the
French seizure of the Custom House at Mitylene (November
1901) to obtain satisfaction of claims of French subjects
against the Government of Turkey? The answer must be
that it was distinctive in nothing except its date, and the prop-
aganda which it generated. . It will be obvious ...that
British claims on Venezuela, 1902-3, differed in no substan-
tial respect from those frequently pressed on Latin American
Governments throughout the nineteenth century.30
As the decades progressed, several factors aided the Latin
Americans in their quest for equality with the nations of the
north and eventually helped them to resist arbitrations they did
not want. One was that more importance was being given to the
Latin American states. At the 1899 Peace Conference at The
Hague, only Mexico represented Latin America. By 1907, sev-
enteen Latin American states were present, including all of the
South American states, three of the Central American ones and
three Caribbean states.81 Another factor was that the United States
itself turned from enthusiasm for arbitration to cautious restraint.82
This meant that arbitral treaties negotiated by the United States,
including those with Latin American countries, contained lan-
guage excepting from arbitration disputes involving the national
honor, vital interests, and so forth. Moreover, the United States
Senate began to insist that the compromis itself, by which a par-
ticular dispute was submitted to arbitration, should be submitted
to the Senate for its advice and consent as a treaty.3 Further-
30. Platt, The Allied Coercion of Venezuela, 1902-03, A Reassessment,
15 INTERAMERICAN ECONOMIC AFFAIRS 3, 10-11 (1962).
31. The Latin American signers of the 1907 Convention for the Pacific
Settlement of International Disputes were Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile,
Colombia, Cuba, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Guatemala, Haiti, Mexico,
Nicaragua, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, El Salvador, Uruguay, and Venezuela. See
2 MALLOY, TREATIES CONVENIONS, INTERNATIONAL ACTS, PROTOCOLS AND
AGREEMENTS BETWEEN THE [U.S.A.] AND OTHER PowERs 2245 (1910).
32. See L. Summers, The Senate and the Arbitration and Adjudication of
International Disputes, 3 INT'L LAw. 564, 575 (1969).
33. The Senate Resolution approving the Second Hague Convention con-
tained this reservation:
That the United States approves this convention with the understand-
Vol. 3
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more, with the fading of old fashioned imperialism, the practice
of gunboat diplomacy by which a large nation could nudge a small
nation into the legal settlement of a dispute was gradually elimi-
nated.84
It is, or course, a mistake to think that the rejection of arbi-
tration happened overnight. Even though the Mexican revolution
was one of the great catalytic agencies for change, its more imme-
diate result as far as Mexico was concerned was to impose a whole
series of arbitrations to decide claims based on revolutionary dam-
ages.3" Nevertheless, the forces of evolution were too strong to re-
sist, and in the post World War II era the old concepts and beliefs
acquired primarily theoretical importance. 6
II. ADJUDICATION INSTEAD OF ARBITRATION
While the zest for arbitration was dwindling at the beginning
of this century, Latin America pioneered the international court
concept as a means for the adjudication of disputes. The Central
American Court of Justice antedated by several years the Per-
manent Court of International Justice which was established after
the First World War. The Court was inaugurated on May 25,
1908, and held its closing session on March 12, 1918, when the
ing that recourse to a permanent court for the settlement of differences
can be had only by agreement thereto through general or special trea-
ties of arbitration heretofore or hereafter concluded between the parties
in dispute; and the United States now exercises the option contained in
article fifty-three of said convention, to exclude the formulation of the'compromis' by the permanent court, and hereby excludes from the
competence of the permanent court the power to frame the 'compromis'
required by general or special treaties of arbitration concluded or
hereafter to be concluded by the United States, and further expressly
declares that the 'compromis' required by any treaty of arbitration to
which the United States may be a party shall be settled only by agree-
ment between the contracting parties, unless such treaty shall expressly
provide otherwise.
2 MALLOY, supra note 31, at 2247.
In more recent years, the United States has taken a very restricted view in
connection with the Pact of Bogota, see supra note 4.
34. The fading imperialism is outlined in Matthews, supra note 19, at 130;
see also Silvert, supra note 26.
35. A. FELLER, supra note 27, at 56-82. It seems fairly clear that the
Mexican government was eager to make concessions to obtain recognition. A.
CARRENO, LA DIPLOMACIA ExTRAORmn!ARiA ENTRE MEXICO Y ESTADOS UNIDOS,
1789-1947 at 289 (1951). Despite Mexican experience with arbitration, it has
been a friend of the arbitral process to a far greater extent than other Latin
American countries. See Everett, supra note 4.
36. President Nixon refers to this new assertiveness of Latin America
and the problems it raises in U. S. Foreign Policy for the 1970"s-The Emerging
Structure of Peace, 66 U.S. DEP'T STATE BULL. 360 (1972).
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Convention on which it was based ceased to be operative. During
this brief existence, it established the innovative practice of per-
mitting individuals to bring suit before the Court. Five out of the
ten cases brought before the Court were initiated by individuals.37
After the First World War, Latin American jurists collabo-
rated in the organization of the First World Court. Among the
twelve jurists invited to formulate plans for the establishment of
the Court were Clovis Bevilaqua of Brazil and Luis Maria Drago
of Argentina. Bevilaqua could not serve and was replaced
by Raoul Fernandez, also of Brazil."' During its existence, sev-
eral distinguished Latin American jurists sat on the Court-Epi-
tacio da Silva Pess6a of Brazil, Antonio S. de Bustamente y Sir-
ven of Cuba, J. Gustavo Guerrero of El Salvador, and Jos6 Ur-
rutia of Colombia. While Latin American nationals sat on the
court and contributed to its work, only one case involving a Latin
American nation was presented to the Court. That case, involv-
ing the payment of the Brazilian Federal Loans issued in France,
was decided on July 29, 1929 in favor of France. Interestingly
enough, two Latin American judges dissented.3 9
At the end of the Second World War, the World Court was
recreated as the International Court of Justice. This time, every
nation that had participated in the San Francisco Conference also
was represented on the Committee of Jurists. Argentina was the
only Latin American nation not participating, since it had not
been an original member of the Conference.4" In the years since
the establishment of the Court, a considerable number of Latin
37. For a brief account of the Central American Court of Justice, see M.
HUDSON, PERMANENT COURT OF INTERNATIONAL JUSTICE 1920-1942 at 42 (1943).
38. J. SCOTT, THE PROJECT OF A PERMANENT COURT OF INTERNATIONAL
JUSTICE AND RESOLUTIONS OF THE ADVISORY COMMITTEE OF JURISTS 3 (1920).
39. The judges of the First World Court are listed in M. HUDSON, THE
PERMANENT COURT OF INTERNATIONAL JUSTICE 1920-1942 at 259, 776 (1943).
The Judgments and Opinions of the Court are given in summary form, along
with citations to the official documents, in M. HUDSON, THE WORLD COURT
1921-1938, A HANDBOOK OF THE PERMANENT COURT OF INTERNATIONAL JUSTICE
82 (1938). The Brazilian case is summarized id. at 122.
40. In a memorandum from the Secretary of State to President Truman,
the Secretary pointed out that the Committee of Jurists representative of 44
nations met in Washington to develop recommendations on the Court. 1 FOR-
EIGN RELATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES 1945 at 362 (1967). All of the Latin
American nations were represented except Argentina. U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, THE
INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE, SELECTED DOCUMENTS RELATIVE TO THE
DRAFTING OF THE STATUTE 165 (1946). On the status of Argentina, see 1
FOREIGN RELATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES 1945, supra, at 503.
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American jurists have sat on the Court.41 Seven Latin American
states accepted the compulsory jurisdiction of the Court condi-
tionally and three accepted it unconditionally.4 2  Several Latin
American states have participated in litigation before the Court,
although not always happily. Thus the decision of the Court in
the Haya de la Torre case between Peru and Colombia created
problems, as it failed to resolve the issues. Colombia, on the
very day the first decision was rendered, asked for an interpreta-
tion, which was denied by the Court. There was additional con-
sideration of the case by the Court, however; but it cannot be
truthfully said that the subsequent action of the Court crystallized
the legal situation to the satisfaction of the parties.43
As time went on the Court became subject to general criti-
cism for its decisions in the South West Africa and the Barcelona
Traction cases, 44 which did not involve Latin America but did
41. The Latin American judges on the International Court of Justice have
been: Jose Gustavo Guerrero, Salvador; Jose Philadelpho de Barros Azevedo,
Brazil; Alejandro Alvarez, Chile; Levi Fernandes Carneiro, Brazil; Isidro Fabela
Alfaro, Mexico; Roberto Cordova, Mexico; Lucio Moreno Quintana, Argentina;
Enrique C. Armand Ugon, Uruguay; Ricardo J. Alfaro, Panama; J.L. Bustamente
y Rivero, Peru; L. Padillo Nervo, Mexico; and Eduardo Jimenez de Arechage,
Uruguay. The composition of the Court is always given in the successive
UNITED NATIONS YEAR BOOK.
42. The ten states are Colombia, Dominican Republic, El Salvador, Haiti,
Honduras, Mexico, Nicaragua, Panama, Paraguay and Uruguay. Only the states
in italics accepted unconditionally. U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, TREATIES IN FORCE,
A LIST OF TREATIES AND OTHER INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENTS OF THE UNITED
STATES IN FORCE ON JANUARY 1, 1972 at 325.
43. Sources, bibliography, and a summary of the Haya de ]a Torre cases
are found in J. SYATAUW, DECISIONS OF THE INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE
39-52 (1969). Other cases before the ICJ in which Latin American states
have participated are the Nottebohm Case, [1955] I.C.J. 4, involving Guatemala,
and the Case Concerning the Arbitral Award Made by the King of Spain on 23
December 1906, [1960] I.C.J. 192, between Honduras and Nicaragua. Great
Britain also tried to have the Court take jurisdiction over Antartica disputes
with Chile and Argentina. Chile and Argentina refused, however, to submit to
the Court.
44. In his address to the American Society of International Law in 1970,
Secretary of State Rogers said:
[W]e should recognize that the Court is at least partly to blame for its
state of neglect. There is no doubt that its reputation was damaged by
its decision in the South-West Africa case-that the complainants had
no standing to present their claims-after more than five years of pro-
ceedings. A similar decision early this year in the Barcelona Traction
case, after more than seven years, has further eroded confidence in the
Court.
64 AM. J. INT'L L. 288 (1970). For summaries of the South-West African
cases and references to sources and bibliography see J. SYATAUW, supra note
43 at 133, The Barcelona Traction case is discussed by Briggs, Barcelona Trac-
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concern the prestige of the Court as a whole. As a consequence
of those criticisms and the experiences of the Latin American
states, it seems unlikely that those states will be willing to use the
Court widely in the future. They probably would be reluctant to
use it even to resolve a dispute among themselves; a fortiori, they
would resist if the other party to the dispute were a North Atlantic
power. The refusal of Ecuador to submit to the Court the dispute
concerning the seizure of west coast tuna boats alleged to have vio-
lated Ecuadorian territorial waters and the refusal of Chile and
Argentina to submit to the jurisdiction of the Court in the Antarc-
tica Cases brought by Great Britain to determine their respective
rights in that area are indicative of present attitudes. 45  The mis-
trust of the Court as an institution does not, however, appear to
extend to individual judges. Striking evidence of this attitude is
that Argentina and Chile quite recently agreed to have the British
arrange a panel of International Court judges to sit as an arbitral
group on a boundary dispute concerning the Beagle Channel.46
III. PRESENT STATUS OF INTERGOVERNMENTAL ARBITRATION
AND ADJUDICATION
At the present time, the Latin American states are parties
to many treaties which contemplate arbitration and adjudica-
tion.47  Since so many of the agreements have important caveats
and since, in any event, it is difficult to persuade a nation to arbi-
trate or adjudicate if it is unwilling to do so, the existence of an
apparently pertinent text does not guarantee that a legal settle-
ment will be forthcoming. As a consequence, arbitration or ad-
judication have proven weak reeds to lean upon in intercontinental
lion: The Jus Standi of Belgium, 65 AM. J. INT'L L. 327 (1971). Briggs takes
issue with the criticism of Secretary Rogers at 331.
45. Cf. Letter from John R. Stevenson, Legal Adviser of the Dep't of State,
to Senator Jacob K. Javits, June 30, 1971:
As Mr. Summers acknowledged, the United States was willing to
take its dispute with Ecuador to the International Court of Justice for
a decision on the merits. Ecuador, however, did not wish to go before
the Court, and could not be compelled to do so, not having accepted
the compulsory jurisdiction of the Court.
46. Argentina-Chile-United Kingdom; Agreement to Arbitrate the Beagle
Channel Controversy, 10 INT'L LEGAL MATERIALS 1182 (1971). See, in con-
trast, the earlier arbitration cited supra note 41.
47. See Everett, supra note 4. The more recent treaties can be found in
United Nations compilations. See SYSTEMATIC SURVEY OF TREATIES FOR THE
PACIFIC SETTLEMENT OF DISPUTES 1928-1948 at 1189 (1948); A SURVEY OF
TREATY PROVISIONS FOR THE PACIFIC SETTLEMENT OF INTERNATIONAL DISPUTES
1949-1962 (1966). Treaties 7, 12, 13, 31 and 32 concern Latin American states.
Vol. 3
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relations. In fact, since the last war all efforts to arbitrate or to
adjudicate disputes between a North Atlantic state and a Latin
American nation have proved almost fruitless. Liechtenstein did
manage to adjudicate a nationality dispute with Guatemala, but
Liechtenstein has never been considered an ex-imperialist power.4"
France, on the other hand, was never able to persuade Brazil to
send the so-called lobster dispute to the Permanent Court of Ar-
bitration,49 and the United States has been unsuccessful in per-
suading Latin American states to arbitrate or adjudicate fishing
and expropriation disputes.50 The Antarctica Cases have already
been noted. 1
Hope springs eternal, however, so the United States has not
given up; attempting, for example, to establish a forum for invest-
ment disputes. Acting under the authority of section 413(b)(4)
of the Mutual Security Act of 1954 as amended, and other laws,
the United States has negotiated a series of investment guarantee
agreements designed to reassure the prudent investor and to en-
courage him to invest abroad by providing a forum for disputes
and a limited insurance against loss. 52 While such agreements
have been negotiated with a number of Latin American countries,
48. See J. SYATAUW, supra note 43, at 77.
49. Rosseau, Chroniques des faits internationaux Brdsil et France, Evolution
du dijjdrend relatif L la p&he de la langouste, 67 REVUE GNfI ALE DE DROIT
INTERNATIONAL PUBLIC 364 (1963).
50. Peru is obviously not even considering arbitrating the IPC quarrel.
See THE LIBRARY OF CONGRESS LEGISLATIVE REFERENCE SERVICE, EXPROPRIATION
BY PERU OF THE INTERNATIONAL PETROLEUM COMPANY (1969).
51. See p. 14 supra.
52. The various investment agreements are given in U.S. DEP'T OF
STATE, TREATIES IN FORCE, supra note 42, under each country and under the
rubric Investment Guarantees. The first such agreement with a Latin American
country was with Haiti in 1953, entered into by authority of section 111(b)(3)
of the Economic Cooperation Act of 1948, ch. 169, § 111, 62 Stat. 143. Then
came a series of agreements entered into by authority of successive acts. See,
e.g., section 413(b)(4) of the Mutual Security Act of 1954, ch. 937, § 413,
68 Stat. 847, and section 221 of the Act for International Development of 1961,
Pub. L. No. 87-195, § 221, 75 Stat. 429. Section 221 of the Act for Interna-
tional Development was eliminated when, as stated in the note to 22 U.S.C.
2181, "[S]ection 221 . . . dealing with the general authority for foreign in-
vestment guaranties by the President was omitted in the general reorganization
of this subpart by Pub. L. 91-175 pt. I, § 105, Dec. 30, 1969, 83 Stat. 807."
The lack of present legislation does not, however, invalidate the previous
agreements arranged under the repealed statute sections. For an example of an
arbitration clause in one of the latest investment agreements, see Investment
Guaranty Agreement with Brazil, Feb. 6, 1965, art. VI, [19671 2 U.S.T. 1807,
1809, T.I.A.S. No. 6327.
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Mexico is conspicuously absent. At the same time, the United
States has fully supported a Convention for the Settlement of In-
vestment Disputes and approved a center for the settlement of
such disputes under the aegis of the World Bank. 3 The Con-
vention is meant for use on a worldwide basis, but there has been
obvious hope that it would be particularly helpful in Latin Amer-
ica. That hope has proven quite illusory: not a single Latin
American nation even signed the Convention.
5 4
On the face of it, the acceptance of investment guarantee
agreements on a bilateral basis, but not under the umbrella of a
multilateral convention, seems contradictory. Possibly the latter
is regarded as an onerous generality, while an agreement with the
United States is viewed with hope as a precursor of needed funds.
The mere fact that the World Bank is big, has its headquarters in
Washington, and is dominated by the large states, also might mili-
tate against the acceptance of the settlement center. Confusing
the issue further is the fact that not all Latin Americans view
foreign investments favorably. Taking the position that foreign
investments result in foreign control of what should be national
enterprises, and that the eventual repatriation of profits and capi-
tal leaves the Latin American state poorer than it was originally,
some Latin Americans look at foreign investments as detrimental
on balance.5 5 On the other hand, many of the Latin American
nations unquestionably want foreign investments in order to de-
velop their economies and UNCTAD (pioneered by an Argentin-
ian, Raoul Prebisch, and still under the strong influence of Latin
America)50 has been in favor of private investments, 57 so they will
53. Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes between States
and Nationals of Other States, June 1, 1966, [1966] 17 U.S.T. 1270, T.I.A.S.
No. 6090.
54. The present parties to the Convention are given in U.S. DEP'T OF
STATE, TREATIES IN FORCE, supra note 42. The reason for the failure of the
Latin American states to become parties to the Convention are analyzed in
Scasz, The Investment Disputes Convention and Latin America, 11 VA. J. INT'L
L. 256 (1971). See also Rudley, Some Aspects of the World Bank Convention
on the Settlement of Investment Disputes, 4 CAN. Y.B. INT'L L. 43 (1966).
55. Sunkel, Big Business and "Dependencia": A Latin American View 50
FOR. AFF. 517 (1972).
56. Manuel Perez Guerrero of Venezuela took the place of Prebisch in
March of 1969. UNCTAD MONTHLY BULLETIN, No. 28 (December 1968).
57. At the first UNCTAD Conference held in Geneva in 1964, a resolu-
tion on private investments read in part:
1. The Governments of capital-exporting developed countries
should avoid measures preventing or limiting the flow of capital from
such countries to developing countries, and should take all appropriate
Vol. 3
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continue to be welcomed in some Latin American countries, if not
by all. It is estimated that as of 1969 existing direct investments
in Latin America from the United States totalled over 1.1 billion
dollars which, even these days, is a substantial sum."s That amount
no doubt has increased somewhat since 1969.
What are the options of the United States in case an Ameri-
can national turns to the Department of State for help in a case of
disagreement with a Latin American government? Force and
duress (the old gunboat diplomacy) obviously is neither desirable
nor possible. The World Court is not an absolute panacea. The
invocation of the investment guarantee agreements may help, but
they cover only a limited number of situations. The net result of
the distrust of intergovernmental arbitration and adjudication
causes the foreigner, anxious to invest in Latin America, to be un-
easy about what may happen in the event of a serious dispute.
Naturally the local courts are open to him, but they will be able to
do little for him if the alleged wrong stems from an executive
action which the courts lack power to challenge. Also, Latin
American courts are notoriously slow in rendering justice. Fur-
thermore, if the question at issue is a technical one, as it may
well be, the judges may lack the technical knowledge requisite
for the case. Finally, judicial venality has been an unfortunate
but not unknown occurrence in the past. 9
steps to encourage the flow of private investments to developing
countries, such as tax exemption or reductions, giving investment
guarantees to private investors investing in developing countries, and by
facilitating the training of managerial and technical staff.
I FINAL ACT AND REPORT 49. The New Delhi Conference of 1968 took the
same position. The record of the Santiago Conference held in 1972 is not yet
available. It would be surprising if, on this point, it were any different.
58. U.S. DEP'T OF COMM., POCKET DATA BOOK, USA 326 (1971).
The United States' viewpoint on the nationalization of investments was
given by Charles A. Meyer, Assistant Secretary for Inter-American Affairs, in
U.S. Policy Toward Latin America-Where We Stand Today, 65 U.S. DEP'T OF
STATE BULL. 559 (1972). At 563 Meyer said:
[M]y government recognizes the right of a sovereign state to
nationalize a foreign-owned property--even though the wisdom, short-
and long-range, of some nationalization we would question. The vital
point is compensation, prompt, adequate, and effective, for any part or
all of a property that is nationalized.
Here is where we of the Americas need the fullest application of
mutual understanding, of give-and-take, of negotiation not confronta-
tion, of third-party adjudication when necessary.
(emphasis added).
59. For an analysis of Latin American courts, see Christensen, The Court;
Public Administration; Municipal Government (Chapter Five), in THE EVOLU-
TION OF LATIN AMERICAN GOVERNMENT 468 (A. Christensen ed. 1951); see also
H. CLAGETT, ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE IN LATIN AMERICA (1952).
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IV. PRIVATE VERSUS STATE ARBITRATION
The question of course arises whether there may not be an
intermediate solution which would satisfy the investor as well as
the government. One possibility that should be explored is that
of private versus state arbitration, which is the progeny of inter-
governmental arbitration and commercial arbitration between in-
dividuals. This device has now been used in many parts of the
world and has been successfully employed to resolve some rather
serious disputes. In contrast to intergovernmental arbitration,
only one of the parties is a government or a government-con-
trolled agency or corporation. The other party is a private con-
cern or individual which has entered into a contract with the for-
eign government containing an arbitration clause for the settlement
of disputes. All the disputes and arbitrations have, so far, cen-
tered on contracts. In theory, disputes arising out of purely tort
actions could also give rise to an arbitration agreement. Thus, a
dispute as to an alleged illegal arrest, for example, might be arbi-
trated. In practice, however, this is highly unlikely to happen.
From the standpoint of the government involved, the great
advantage is that it does not have to face another government in
the proceedings. While a private person may be the true party
in interest in an intergovernmental arbitration, the government
protecting him nevertheless looms large. Thus the claim is
brought in the name of the complaining state. A typical caption
reads The United States of America ex rel John Doe v. The United
Mexican States. Moreover, the Agent of the complaining govern-
ment controls the case. Strictly speaking, the arbitration provision
under the Convention for Investment Disputes calls for private
versus state arbitration. The use of that Convention, however,
has not been very encouraging. Only one case has been brought
under the Convention, and that one is very recent.60 It may be
that a multilateral convention does not offer sufficient scope for
elasticity.
Private versus state arbitration is still rather novel, so it is
neither well understood nor well documented, although many ef-
forts have been made by learned societies and kindred bodies to
promote it.61 There have been several studies on the subject as a
60. ASIL NEWSLETTER, April 1972.
61. Domke, Arbitration between Governmental Bodies and Private Firms,
17 ARBrrRATION JOURNAL 129 (1962).
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whole or on one or more phases of the subject.62 Nevertheless,
despite the author's best efforts, he has been unable to find a
really comprehensive discussion of the development of private ver-
sus state arbitration. In fact, it is difficult to make an estimate of
just how many cases there have been. A number have been ar-
bitrated under the auspices of the International Chamber of Com-
merce in Paris. Schwebel and Wetter, in an article in the Amer-
ican Journal of International Law, mention thirty-eight other cases
not connected with the ICC.63 Nor is it clear that all problems
have been resolved. For example, does such arbitration eliminate
the necessity for the exhaustion of local remedies?
Private versus state arbitration has not been widely practiced
in domestic settings where the United States would be the state
party. Its growth is inhibited by the ruling of the Comptroller
General in the Bofors Case. In essence, the Comptroller General
held that branches of the government of the United States could
not arbitrate a case with a private contractor without specific legis-
lative authority, on the theory that to agree to arbitrate might
62. See Carabiber, L'arbitrage international entre gouvernments et particu-
liers, 76 RECUEIL DES CouRs 219 (1950-51). Other studies are: Arechaga,
L'arbitrage entre les itats et les societis privies gtrang~res, MELANGES EN
L'HONNEUR DE GILBERT GiDEL 367 (1961); Batiffol, Arbitration Clauses con-
cluded between French Government-Owned Enterprises and Foreign Private Par-
ties, 7 COLuM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 32 (1968); Bbckstiegel, Arbitration of Disputes
between States and Private Enterprises in the International Chamber of Com-
merce, 59 AM. J. INT'L L. 579 (1965); Guyomar, Le r~glement de la cout
permanente d'arbitrage relatif aux conflits internationaux entre deux parties dont
une seulement est un itat, 8 ANNuAiRE FRANgAIS D DROIT INTERNATIONAL 377
(1962); Ketcham, Arbitration between a State and a Foreign Private Party,
SOUTHWESTERN LEGAL FOUNDATION, INTERNATIONAL AND COMPARATIVE LAW
CENTER, RIGHTS AND DUTIES OF PRIVATE INVESTORS ABROAD 403-25 (1965);
Kojanec, Problemes de l'arbitrage entre etats et companies privies 6trangers,
YEARBOOK OF THE A.A.A. OF THE HAGUE ACADEMY OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 99
(1967/1968); Lalive, Contracts between a State or a State Agency and a For-
eign Company, 13 INT'L & COMP. L.Q. 987 (1964); Lalive, Un recent arbitrage
Suisse entre un organisme d'etat et une socigtg privie gtrang~re, 19 ANNUAIRE
SUISSE DE DROIT INTERNATIONAL 273 (1962); Mann, State Contracts and Inter-
national Arbitration, 42 BRIrr. Y.B. INT'L L. 1 (1967); Rihtman, Arbitration
between Governments and Government Controlled Bodies and Foreign Business
Firms, 9 JUGOSLOVENSKA REVIJA ZA MEDUNARODNA PRAVO 359 (1960); Ssekandi,
Contracts between a State and a Foreign Private Company, Reflections on the
Effectiveness of the Arbitration Process, 2 E. AFRICAN L.J. 281 (1966); Suratgar,
The Sapphire Arbitration Award, 3 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 152 (1965).
63. Schwebel & Wetter, Arbitration and the Exhaustion of Local Remedies,
60 AM. J. INT'L L. 484 (1966). At 486 the authors state that the thirty-eight
awards ". . . include a high proportion of all the instances in which arbitra-
tions between states and aliens have taken place."
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commit the particular agency to pay funds it did not have. 4 This
has not, however, prevented some American governmental cor-
porations and enterprises from participating in such operations
connected with their operations abroad.
In Latin America, the acceptance of private versus state ar-
bitration is particularly uncertain. Contributing to that uncer-
tainty is rising nationalism, mistrust of foreign investments, the
experiences of the past, and an unwillingness to experiment when
the necessity and desirability of experiments is not fully apparent.
At the same time, the possibilities of private versus state arbitration
are too important to be ignored. If the practice becomes accepta-
ble and the conditions for its use are propitious, it might constitute
an adequate procedure for the settlement of disputes which could
be used where other procedures have failed. Further, it might
help restore confidence in the legal settlement of disputes general-
ly. However, even if private versus state arbitration is accepted,
it is by no means clear whether it will be used in lieu of court
procedures or only after all the legal remedies have been exhaust-
ed. Naturally, if the latter is true, arbitration loses much of its
charm.
Since it is almost impossible to obtain sufficient answers from
the available books and materials, the author has directed ques-
tionnaires to government officials and to private concerns in hope
of obtaining a reasonably accurate picture of: (1) the present
extent of private versus state arbitration in Latin America, (2) its
present and future acceptability in Latin America, (3) attitudes
toward such arbitration, and (4) the relation of such arbitration
to the exhaustion of legal remedies. The results of these ques-
tionnaires, coupled with an analysis of the comments and criti-
cisms which hopefully will be stimulated by this article, will be
the subject of a further discussion in volume 4, number 1, of the
California Western International Law Journal.
64. The Bofors Case is reported in 32 DEcIsioNs OF THE COMPTROLLER
GENERAL 333 (1959). The Bofors Case is still good law. Letter from the
Office of the General Counsel, Comptroller General of the United States, to
Lionel M. Summers, Dec. 9, 1971.
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